compromise. we have given them the weapons and tactics that are not realistic as to their capability to maintain that after we are gone. general, i was wondering if you could reflect on that. >> i have seen that same artillery. i would point out that the u.s. army and u.s. marine corps have a lot of artillery, and the afghans have had it for decades. it is nothing new for the afghan army of the past or present. did you have mortars as well. they have light mortars and medium calabar -- caliber mortars as well. they can have high mobility, and then they have some that are less mobile. i have seen the attached those

-- >> mortars did not require all the support elements. you and i differ on that. let me ask you about the cultural corruption in afghanistan security forces. the general officer in charge of that hospital was merely transferred and never relieved. afghan police and soldiers were dying in the hospital from malnutrition and lack of medical care because the families could not come up with the necessary

bribes. it speaks to a lack of oversight. it speaks to not just the culture of corruption, but to what extent have reformed and military organization? how capable or they when they would allow this to occur? i wonder if you could reflect on that. who wants to start? >> if i could start, first of all, thank you for your concern and interest. the situation at the military hospital is one where we began investigating and working with the afghans to take collective action. there are investigations and corrective action under way with that hospital. let me go back to the words you

used. culture of corruption. there is, to be frank, and thousands of years of history in afghanistan surrounding regions where corruption has been part of the fabric of life. it is not something that the afghan people want. it is not something that the majority of the afghan military officers want themselves. the ministers on down, i have seen a lot to -- a lot of leaders at the top, in the middle, and ordinary soldiers committed to not allowed corruption to destroy the structures. yes, there is corruption. corruption continues to be a problem. we have to work with the afghans to give them the capability to get rid of that corruption. that is a challenge. not only do need to have laws in

place, you have to have the effective structures in place. you have to have the judicial system, prosecutors, courts, a system of incarceration, all these things the afghans are rebuilding. it is a huge challenge. all recognize that corruption is a problem, i would not agree that it is endemic to the point where our investments are not going to pay off. we have some really good partners in the afghans. we have some problematic ones. i appreciate the point you're making. the things that happened at the hospital are the kinds of things that should not happen to any human being anywhere. we're working with the afghans to correct them. >> thank you. i am concerned that issue at the hospital is something that could be representative throughout the

afghan security forces. i think we need to get down to the bottom of it. thank you so much. >> we will move to mr. johnson. >> thank you for allowing me as a non member of the subcommittee to ask questions today. greetings, a settlement. -- welcome. can you characterize for us the evolution of the afghan security forces' readiness over the last decade? tell me when they started aurning a corner to become force to be reckoned with in afghanistan. >> i was on the ground in afghanistan, may 1, 2002, when

the first u.s. special forces arrived to begin training the afghan army. a little over 10 years ago. from that very discouraging start, we had not enough money, and not enough trainers, and not enough trainees, we have made incredible progress. i would also say that for too long, the efforts in afghanistan was under resources to both in terms of money and also in terms of the level of training and support that we ever able to give. the admiral describe that very graphically. >> [inaudible] >> the turning point was about three years ago. falling the strategic review by president obama -- a fall in the

strategic review by president obama, which recognized we had not been doing in afghanistan. we put additional resources and we really began to build the afghan security forces if to the size and capability they are not showing. we made the strategic decision -- >> let me interrupt you because i have a few other questions. i am sorry, i would love to listen. how the taliban -- how many taliban are we fighting now in afghanistan? >> there are estimates from the intelligence community. it is a very hard figure to come up with how many. many people who fight are part- time taliban. >> i think most of them would be part-timers.

approximately how many? 20,000? >> the last estimate was 15,000 to 20,000. >> ok. the commitment to withdrawing their forces by the end of 2014, does that include special operations forces? >> we have committed to drawing down our forces by the end of 2014. ending a lead combat role, but we have committed to continuing a presence in afghanistan after 2014. in a strategic partnership agreement that we signed with afghanistan last month, we agreed to begin negotiations on a bilateral security agreement, which will set the parameters for what that force is, including the participation of special forces after 2014. we're about to begin those

negotiations to come up with how many special forces will be in afghanistan after 2014. >> we are talking about 233,000 afghan national security forces by 2017. we would be drawing down about 120,000 from the the force at its maximum height. that is going to produce 120,000 jobless individuals who understand how to fight. what do we do with those? 230,000 on 20,000. how do we get to that 230,000 manpower figure? >> that is one of the subjects that secretary panetta

discussed. they agreed to have a regular six-month review of where the afghan security forces stand and what our future plans are. the security situation in afghanistan to see if -- what pace that would allow for the drawdown of the afghan security forces to a long-term sustainable level. the goal of something in the neighborhood of 230,000 by 2017 is what we broadly agreed to. the actual pace and the character is something we will be doing in these six-month reviews. in terms of what happens to those who might be demobilized, there is a certain level of natural attrition. they sign on for three-year and four-year and five-year contracts.

there is a certain level of normal reduction in forces. there is a possibility of such things as a reserve force. we have had -- >> who would pay for those? >> in terms of payment, we have worked on a future plan of funding for afghanistan that would come from the united states, come from our international partners. more and more from afghanistan in itself. >> how did we arrive at taha 230,000 -- how did we arrive at the 230,000 mark for 2017? is that still a reasonable estimate of the number of afghan security forces on the ground at that time?

20,000 taliban. >> that figure depends audit of the degrading of the taliban. -- on the d rating of the taliban. -- degrading of the taliban. we will check and see if that is happening. a much diminished taliban and much less effective taliban will require less forces. that is what that calculation is based on. we will be looking at it every six months to see if that is, in fact, happening. >> we're going to start with the second round of questions. there are some interesting panel members. i will follow up on mr. johnson's question. looking at the underlying assumptions of where we are going with ansf, my question is,

what are the assumptions and analysis to determine that that was the proper structure at the time? how does that coincide with the drawdown of american troops during that time period? if you could lay out where the thought process is gone, where it has been, where we are today. i know there is a resource element associated with that, but also a strategic element associate with that. >> first of all, the 352,000 was the result of a live analysis to include war gaming and that kind of thing. to allow us to defeat, allowed the ansf to defeat the taliban. there has been a decision by our

government to sustain that through 2015. that is to get them through a year or more after are drawdown and a through elections. a sensitive time frames that will happen in the future. how do you get to some number in the future? why 230,000? we ran a number of planning excursions and 230,000 is just one of them. quite honestly, it is one that we would probably pick for ourselves that is a smaller force that is pretty well equipped and capable. there were other courses of action. some larger with less capability. to have more troops, you have to have fewer trucks and helicopters and things like that. the 230,000 course of action is one that we agreed to with the

afghans and our international partners. there is a resource, that is the $4.1 billion course of action. the six-month reviews, every six months, we will reevaluate. does that still makes sense to us based on the threats, based on what is going on in the world? the afghans would like to have a larger force. and more capability. but the world community is going to fund most of that and there is a trade-off. as we go down the road, we will make these six-month reviews and determine if 230 makes sense or maybe something else makes sense. at some point in the near future, we will be asking the afghans to actually, ok, give us your preferred course of action. we have done a lot of that planning. >> in speaking about those six-

month reviews, i am assuming they will also include isef forces. you're looking at drawdown of the ansf forces. we will be theoretically out. will those evaluations considered if we have not reached an acceptable security conditions, with present after december 2014? >> nato heads of state mandate ends on 2014. that was a minute -- that was a decision made in lisbon and 2010. afghan -- afghan security forces would be fully in the lead by 22 014. the actions that will be carried

out by the forces will be considered, but as nato stated in chicago, and defining an interim milestone in 2013, that will be the point at which afghan forces are in the lead with our support. there will be a year and a half for the afghan forces in the lead. as they become more and more in the lead, they will be less and less isef support. we will be evaluating the performance of the afghan security forces. it is very much a unitary process.

looking at the entire spectrum in the whole country of afghanistan. >> i understand that president karzei cannot run again. there has not been a credible election it yet in afghanistan. i note in iraq, coalition forces actively supported the independent electoral commission to make sure there were credible elections. what efforts will be made next time to make sure that -- or to assist the afghan people to make sure there is a credible election so there is a peaceful transition of power? >> thank you very much. you have hit on a key issue, which is the successful election and a successful transition of power, something

that does not happen in that region of the world. it will be an historic achievement and one that the afghan people are very much aware of. president karzei has pledged publicly and privately that he plans to step down and to facilitate the transfer of power. in terms of the department of defense, in terms of the military role, in terms of the role that nato and isaf will play, in both of the elections, the security protection available in areas where security had been achieved was led by the afghan forces, particularly in 2009. the judgment of our commanders in the field that that will be able to be the case in 2014 as well. in terms of the military's role, we will be supporting the afghan security forces to the degree necessary in 2014. the biggest challenge, of

course, is having a credible and legitimate process that results in a transfer of power that the afghan people see as legitimate. there is a very active political dialogue in afghanistan already and our colleagues at the state department and elsewhere are working to that end. on the security side, all indications are we think the afghan security forces are going to be in very good shape to take the lead and be very effective in maintaining security during election periods. >> going forward, president karzei has come down on the night raids. in terms of mile understanding, they are very effective in terms of capturing key and surgeons. where are we at right now with the night raids in terms of

working with karzei administration? >> quite honestly, congressman, at the night raids question has pretty much dropped. it was highly pressurized a few months ago, and now it has dropped significantly. we made this agreement on night raids or special operations with the government of afghanistan. we are turning the overnight raids and accelerated pace to them. they have now four of their own strike forces sitter doing these raids side-by-side. there partnered with the americans, there enabled by americans, they're completely in the lead. there are coalition forces that are still operating each night. their partner also with afghans. it is a discussion that we had earlier -- they are partners also would afghans. it is a discussion that we had earlier. the pressure on that topic has dropped significantly with the

government of afghanistan. >> in terms of our ability to phase down our forces, be able to -- been able to redeploy them out of afghanistan, utilizing pakistan has become an issue in working with the pakistani government, i wonder if you could reflect on where we are right now in that negotiation process. >> we have been talking with the pakistanis about reopening the lines of communications. we continue those discussions. people from my office have been involved in those discussions. identity was in islamabad for the last six or seven weeks -- my deputy was islamabad for the last seven or six weeks. we do find a great deal of willingness to reopen those. we will report back when that happens.

primarily, due to our partnerships with a number of other countries to the north of afghanistan, we have been able to continue operations without any interruption or any hindrance. the level of supplies for our troops in afghanistan, for our nato partners, is higher now than it was before this pakistan it crawled lights of communications were closed. it does cost -- before these pakistan the ground lines of communications were closed. due to some tremendous work by our colleagues, we are in very good shape and able to move forces in and out and equipment in and out of afghanistan as is necessary. however, we do not want to be dependent upon the north anymore

than we want to be depended upon pakistan. we are interested in having both routes open. a diversity of supply lines. >> we will move back to mr. johnson. the $4 billion that is projected to be necessary to support that smaller force of 230,000 ansf in 2017, that represents about 20% of the afghan current gdp. if we assume that afghanistan will experience economic growth and improvement in governance, maintaining that force will, of

course, require substantial international contributions. what steps are being taken to get commitments from international donors? , to progress have been made? >> -- how much progress have we made? >> last year, former secretary of defense gates proposed that our isaf partners contribute 1 billion euros. we have been working very actively with our nato and other partners, including countries in the middle east and asia. i would say we are very close to that goal right now. some of these discussions are still in diplomatic channels. i am not in a position to give you the details. we've got a very positive response. countries are willing to make multi-year commitments.

the commitments that were made in chicago have been very positive. at the same time, the goal by 2024, is that afghanistan will be able to become self sustaining. that is a very -- it is going to require a huge growth in the afghan economy. there are prospects in another -- in the number of areas for that growth. it all depends on security. if security is in place and afghanistan has a lot of areas where its economy can grow. that comes back to the afghan security forces. we have been very pleased with the response from other countries and we look forward to giving you more details. >> i understand also that the

poppy crop, the level of production has declined dramatically this season. what is the reason for that? >> the full evaluation of that is still ongoing. we should have that official reports in a few weeks. from what we understand, there is a combination of factors. one of the largest is whether -- weather, but we're also seeing a decline in production. the combination of increased security and an effective crop substitution efforts, giving

farmers the opportunity to grow something else, even though it might be less profitable. it is much more secure because they do not have the risk of having their crop destroyed. they have legitimate alex -- outlets. the largest reasons are natural. they're both natural and there is a result of policies. >> can you share a little bit about the afghan police forces? what will be our financial commitment, if any, for them? >> the financial commitment was for the afghan security forces, including the army and police. but the uniformed police, the border police, and the afghan police. the police in afghanistan does

lag behind. the police and afghanistan -- in afghanistan very much higher casualty rate than the army. they tend to be in smaller groups, often isolated. they're quite often the choice of target for the insurgents. the combination has made it more challenging to build the police. however, we see significant progress, the patrician figures -- attrition figures show that police are staying in longer, becoming part of their communities in an effective way. there are continuing problems with corruption. it is a problem in the police forces in many areas in afghanistan that needs to be addressed. i do not know, steve, do you have any comments? >> my experience over the last

year, it continues to improve. this is most notable in the selection and promotion of leadership. when i first got there, i had an afghan police terrell was my partner. -- police general that was my partner. i was quite nervous because he was not a very corrupt and i thought an honest guy trying to do right for his country, i was very concerned. in every case, the incoming leader prove to be better than his predecessor. that was my experience. >> thank you. >> i would like to thank the members of the committee as our witnesses today for your testimony. we appreciate the time. this hearing is adjourned.

>> this weekend, harvard professor of the civil war and the movement to end slavery. >> it is one of the fascinating aspects of abolitionism. the self-described abolitionists are still a minority, what transformed abolitionist into a respected critics of the american scene. >> lost -- lectures in history, saturday night at 8:00. "the contenders" sunday at 7:30.

american history tv this weekend on c-span3. this weekend, she tells "fast and furious." >> there are hundreds of innocent mexican citizens who have been murdered as a result of this. the only thing we knew outside of the government program was that guns from american gun dealers for going into mexico and causing all of these problems with the cartel. the government was sanctioning these sales and sending them into mexico. >> she is interviewed by a white house correspondent. sunday night at 9:00. >> senator john mccain criticizes the obama administration for its approach to the syrian conflict.

the ranking member of the armed services committee is calling for the u.s. or actively assist the syrian opposition. the american enterprise institute hosted the senator on monday. this is two hours. before entering politics. when it comes to syria, he has taken leadership on the issue within the u.s. and its and within the entire u.s. government. he has distinguished himself as the conscience of the senate on this and other issues.

thank you, senator mccain, for joining us. we look forward to your remarks. [applause] >> thank you very much. thank you, michael. it is a pleasure to be here. i notice from the faces and the crowd, there are a number of interns spending their summer. if there is such a thing of reincarnation, i wanted to come back as an intern here in washington. i know most of you are spending your time at the library of congress on the weekends as well. it is a pleasure to be back at aei. one of the four most institutions that has contributed so much to the dialogue and discussion that takes place here. it is great to be back among many friends. i usually try to begin my

speeches with a joke but we are talking about syria, it is too horrifying, to heartbreaking, and to exasperatingly. for 15 months, at the syrian people have faced an onslaught of violence from bashar al-assad and his forces. it is now estimated that as many as 12,000 lives have been lost. some suspect that figure is even higher. there is no end in sight. he appears to be accelerating his fight to the fetish. amid all of this violence, it is important to recognize the clear trend is towards an escalation. he has gone from using infantry and snipers to tanks and artillery, to turn in this special units and playing -- and

militias to massacre men, women, and children. we are now seeing a rapid increase in his use of helicopter gun ships. his forces once saw to clear an old brown, they now appear to be under orders to kill anyone and everyone they deemed a threat. there is every reason to believe that he will continue to escalate the violence, more massacres, more use of helicopters, and perhaps worse weapons after that. meanwhile, assad and his forces continue to be armed by russia and iran. russia apparently continues to ship heavy weapons, including the very helicopter gunships that he is currently using to bomb civilians. whether these are new helicopters or old ones, it is a

distinction without a difference. they're not reports that russia has dispatched to ships and a unit of russian marines to reinforce their naval base. there also delivering additional anti-aircraft missiles to help defend the regime. clearly, this is not a fair fight. amid all the violence and syria, we cannot grow numb to the human tragedy. joe lieberman and i visited a refugee camp in turkey. the stories that those syrians told still haunt me. menu of lost all their children. women and girls who had been gang raped. children you have been tortured.

none of this, mind you, was the random acts of cruelty that sadly occur in war. syrian army defectors told us killing and rape and torture where what they were instructed to do as a tactic of terror and intimidation. if i get a little emotional when i talk about syria, that is why. which comes to the administration's policy toward syria, to say they are leading from behind is too generous. that suggests they are leading. they're just behind. the administration now appears to be placing its hopes in the russian government to push the share of assaad from power. this is the same -- bashar al- assad from power. this is the same government that continues to supply weapons and moral support to assad, and even

blamed the recent slaughter of civilians on the opposition and foreign powers. the more basic problem with this approach is that the administration has already tried it. moscow rejected it and shut down the u.n. security council. what has changed to make things different now? what the president does not seem to realize is what president bill clinton came to understand in bosnia. a diplomatic resolution in conflicts like these is not possible until the military balance of power changes on the ground. as law as the murderous dictator believes he is winning on the battlefield, he has no incentive to stop fighting and negotiate. this industry for the regime's foreign supporters. for whatever their reasons, the

russian government has stuck wtih assad for 15 months. what makes us think that president putin will change course now? we are now approaching a major point of decision. kofi annan's plant, which does not even call for assad to go, has been a failure for months. his increasing reliance on helicopter gunships is giving new impetus to calls for a no- fly zone. russia is unlikely to ever support a policy of regime change in syria. did ministrations approach is being overtaken by events. -- the administration's approach is being overtaken by events. their growing more effective militarily. this is no thanks to us.

public reports suggest that some of our friends from the middle east are now armed rebel groups in syria. this may explain some of the recent reports that opposition forces have been able to destroy some of the tanks and prevent his forces from retaking and holding some key terrain. some will try to interpret these developments as evidence that the united states should maintain a hands-off approach to syria. this is wrong. first, the fact that the opposition in syria is doing better militarily? to external support seems to validate what many of us have been arguing for months. opposition forces have enough organization to be supportable and our support in helping to further improve their organization and command and control. this is an argument for doing more, not less to aid rebel fighters and syria. second, what is good that some foreign military assistance now

seems to be reaching the opposition in syria, this alone will not be decisive. it will not be sufficient to end the conflict faster. it may even just prologue said. nearly every serious i speak with tells me the same thank. blogger this conflict try -- draws on comet -- the logger this conflict drags on, the more radicalized it becomes. the serious opposition needs to know that the united states stands with them. we're willing to take risks to support them when they need it most. our current inaction only denies us the opportunity to have influence with the forces in syria who will one day in europe the country. we are saying that -- we are seeing that influence of foreign states that may not always share our interests and our values or to extremist groups that may not

always -- that are hostile to us. our lack of involvement is not preventing the militarization of the conflict. or lessening the risk of sectarian violence. or countering the appeal of extremist groups. all of these events are just happening without us. without our ability to influence them, in short, the main reason the united states needs to get more involved is to help the opposition into the conflict sooner while they can still secure an outcome that is consistent with their goals and ours. we should do so because it is our national security interest. the commander of u.s. central command, the fall ofassad would be the biggest blow to iraq in 25 years. there are risks to greater involvement in syria.

the opposition is still struggling to get organized. al qaeda and other extremist are working to hijack the revolution. they're already reports of reprisal killings. these risks are real and serious. but the risk of continuing to do nothing or worse. if we fail to act, the consequences are clear. syria will become a failed state, threatening both our ally israel and our nato ally turkey. with or without assad, the country will develop into a full-scale civil war. violence and radicalism will spell even more into lebanon and iraq. serial will turn into a battlefield between extremist, each backed by foreign powers, which will ignite sectarian

tensions from africa to the gulf. this is the course we are on in syria. we must act now to avoid it. the u.s. action division would not be unilateral. it would be multilateral. we would work closely with arab and european allies, especially turkey and our partners in the gulf. as in libya, there would be no boots on the ground. ground, and we would all intervene at request of legitimate representatives of the syrian people. our goal would be to help the opposition change the military balance of power on the ground, and thereby creating conditions for the end of the violence, the departure of assad and his cronies, and a transition as quickly as possible. we first have to help them establish safe havens inside the country. this is essential for a number of reasons. it is constantly said that the syrian organization is disorganized. that may be true at the national level but is much less

true at the local level. to the contrary, revolutionary councils and local coordinating committees are in cities across syria, increasingly sophisticated and effective. i met some of their members and representatives, and they are among the most impressive figures i have encountered in the syrian opposition. nonetheless, if the syrian opposition is to succeed, it means an effective and unifying structure of some kind. it is unlikely that such kind of structure can be formed in syria until there is a safe haven, a place where they can emerge from hiding, gathered together in safety, select leaders, and organize themselves as an alternative governing

structure, not just for the purpose of giving him from power today but to prepare for the challenge of the administering and securing the country once he is gone. this is what the national transitional council was able to do in benghazi. it is less difficult to imagine today how safe havens can be established in syria. indeed, some analysts suggest the opposition may already be creating some areas of de facto control in the country, for example in some areas north along the turkish border and in eastern syria. it is quite possible led the opposition could declare parts of syria to be liberated and then ask for external helped, support in defending the territory. this is exactly what we should be helping the opposition to do.

rather than insisting that we cannot act militarily without a un security council resolution, as the secretary of defense recently asserted, we should follow president clinton's example. we should refuse to give russia and china beach power over our actions and instead work to shape a coalition of willing states with a legitimate mandate to intervene militarily in syria. many of our allies are willing to do much more. as one regional official told "the wall street journal" last weekend, they are looking for, quote, the ironclad backing of the u.s. and others. we should provide it for them. we should make u.s. air power available.

along with that of our allies, as part of an international area to defend safe areas in syria and to keep assad's forces from harassing them, as they will do. these will become platforms for increased deliveries of food, medicine, doctors to treat the wounded, and other nonlethal assistance. it can also serve as staging areas for armed groups to receive battlefield intelligence, body armor, and weapons, including antitank weapons, and to train and organize themselves more effectively, perhaps with foreign assistance. the goal would be to expand the reach of the safe havens across more of the country. as a final part of this strategy, we must think about the situation in syria in a broader strategic context. unfolding from lebanon to syria to iraq, this is all part of one connected story. we must be thinking about how we can capitalize on the fall

of the assad regime in syria, to strengthen the sovereignty and independence of lebanon, to support the reconciliation of sectarian conflicts with politics, not violence, to increase the government in iraq to roll back its situation and to share power more democratically in the region. in all of these efforts, the united states and turkey share common interests and values, and we need to be working more closely together, but most of all, what is needed most is american leadership. if there ever were a case that should remind us of our interests being in the visible from our values, it is syria. a few days after the massacre,

"the washington post the" interviewed a man who survived genocide in 1995. this is having looked at the ongoing slaughter in syria. quote, "it is bizarre how "never again" has come to mean "again and again," he said. what is happening in syria today is almost identical to what happened in bosnia two decades ago. he could not be more correct. serious debate is indistinguishable from bosnia in the 1990's with one exception. in bosnia, president clinton finally summoned the courage to lead the world to intervene and stop the killing. it is worth recalling his words about the military action in bosnia in 1995, and i quote, he said, "there are times and places," president clinton said, "where we can defend our values

as a people and serve our most basic strategic interests. there are still times when america and america alone can make a difference for peace." those were the words of the democratic president who led america to do the right thing and stopping the mass atrocities in bosnia, and i remember working with my republican colleague, bob dole, to support president clinton in that endeavor. the question for another democratic president today and for all of us in positions of responsibility is whether we will again answer the desperate pleas for rescue that are made uniquely to us as the united states of america, and whether we will use our great power, as we have done before, not simply to advance our own interests but to serve a just cause that is greater than our interests

alone. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. senator mccain has also graciously agreed to answer some questions. please come to the microphone and make your questions brief after introducing yourself. >> hello, john mccain. my name is -- and i am with the green youth policy in sweden. while kofi annan is a very wise person, and he has worked really hard for finding a diplomatic solution to the

situation in syria, what he means is that you should always primarily look for a nonviolent solution to conflict, and i was wondering whether the united states was working for and implementing more diplomatic pressure against the assad regime. thank you. >> do you have any ideas to support them diplomatically or kofi annan? i would like to hear it. certainly, this administration has. but the fact is that it is being knowledge even by kofi annan that his plan has failed. u.n. observers have just gone back to areas where they would not be subject to attack. it is widely acknowledged that the plan, as some of us predicted, has failed, so if you have any ideas on how we

could be more active diplomatically, i would be more than encouraged to hear. the fact is that this is a brutal dictator who was willing to massacre his own people, and his people have reason to try to overthrow him, and i believe the only way for him to leave is if mr. assad believes he cannot stay. they do. >> hello, my name is -- i am an undergraduate. i was interested the dimensions, obviously, how do you feel about a syrian regime change? it could provoke violence in some form or another.

>> i think the first thing that happens is the connection between a land and hezbollah and their influence in lebanon is dramatically reduced. i think that the iranians have syria as really the only arab state like that remaining. i do not think there is any doubt with a loss of syria, they lose their connections to hezbollah. they lose their connections to lebanon. perhaps mr. maliki would think more about the closer relations he should have with iran, and with that loss, i think it may put additional pressures on iran to cease their continuing to develop nuclear weapons, which, as you know, is a forthcoming crisis, unless the iranians

abandoned their efforts to wield a nuclear weapons, which so far there has been no indication that they have. this is a key and central part of the entire middle east, and what happens here will have a dramatic effect on the entire middle east as well. thank you. yes? >> senator mccain, i am the daughter of one of the speakers. i am a syrian, a political refugee who came here with my family in 2006. we hear from policymakers in the current demonstration that the united states cannot afford intervening in syria. as serious, how can we change that? the people are dying. if that is the main excuse they gave.

and we cannot see any change, and we cannot convince them, i totally agree with what you said. what can you give us? what can we do to convince them that we really need to end this dictatorship? thank you very much. >> i have to tell you that the political realities here in the united states, americans are very weary of wars because of our long and projected engagement in iraq and in afghanistan. a couple thousands of young americans have given their lives. americans see our economy in a very bad situation, and that has tended, of course, to lead to a more inward view and a lack of a desire for involvement.

i believe that the same arguments that you hear being made about syria today are the same ones that were made about libya, that we would get into a protracted conflict, that it would be overtaken by al qaeda, we do not know who they are. my friends on both the right and left have seen these arguments. if there is a basic principle. one is that no one i know of is advocating american goods on the ground or american military action. i do know for a fact that our allies in the region are crying out for american leadership, and no one that i know of once american boots on the ground or once a unilateral united states action, and, frankly, they are the most immortal words in my view ever written that all of us, all of us are endowed by

our creator with certain inalienable rights, among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. the united states of america has shared its blood and spent its treasurer in all four corners of the world in defense of others freedom. many times it was in our interest as well. for a little encouragement, i wrecks allies are picking up the slack. yes, sir. thank you, senator. my question to you is about the repercussions of holding the opposition and treating a safe

haven for them. we read reports that they are recruiting g hottest -- ihadists. could we have a afghan-like situation afterward? >> we went to afghanistan because that is where the attacks of 9/11 began. we should never forget that. i have seen the movie before. yes, they will come into libya. -- 80% of the people of libya have registered to vote. it will have an election on july 2. i hope i'll be there to observe. the longer this conflict is protracted, the more likely it is that that happens, that foreign fighters come in, al qaeda and others. because of the frustration and anger and casualties that the syrian people experience.

so all i can say is that we are looking at the situation of a protracted, drawn out conflict where a sod is being supplied with arms, equipment, helicopter, tanks, and reports even of russian troops being possibly moved into syria against people who are basically without any real means to defend themselves. it is not a fair fight. it is not a civil war because all the military strength is on one side and not the other. at least we ought to give them the chance to have a fair fight. yes, sir.

our staff is on its way. work-release program. >> many see this as a losing alliance. " we have our differences with the russians, is there any way to make them abandon support for a side? it has been a puzzle. the russians are very intelligent. vladimir putin is a smart man. but they are doing a enormous damage to their image in the arab world. they are harming themselves dramatically, and i do not quite understand that. i do not pretend to be able to get into present putin's mind, but there is a certain nostalgic in russia for the old russian empire. this is the last outpost and port on the mediterranean.

this is, in many ways, a test as to whether or this disease called the arab spring will spread to other parts of the world, including places like chechnya, which was put down with incredible, exceptional brutality. so i cannot fathom all the reasons for the russian behavior as it continues to be. i hope that the president, who i understand is meeting with putin today, will be able to bring about some change in their behavior, but in my future is also part of a pattern of his behavior since the elections. fines on demonstrators, jailing people, intimidation of the media, etc.. that does not mean that i believe the cold war be reignited. it is not. but i also think we will have to take a much more realistic view

of our relationship with russia and our ability to do business with them. yes, sir. >> thank you, mr. senator. i'm from norway with the party. the city solution for syria may happen outside of the un system. -- you said a situation for syria may happen outside the un. is that the world the obama administration is fearing? could that be the reason for non-involvement. >> what it really is is that the situation today is that russia and china now have a veto power over any united states policy or action that you united states my take. that, obviously, is not acceptable to the american people. our actions cannot be governed about whether -- bi whether

russia will or will not veto a u.n. security council resolution. i mentioned in my book about costco. we went there without a security council resolution. -- about kosovo. when there without a security council to resolution. that was a coalition of the willing, as we say. i respect and admire the-nations security council and the things that they do, but the fact is national security should not be governed by whether russia will veto resolutions in the security -- united nations security council. please go ahead. >> my name is tyler o'neill. my question is about turkey. with the party successful in

last year's elections in 2011, they seem to have a shift towards islamism. do you think their interests been coincidental with united states would change in that situation? >> i believe that turkey is one of our strongest allies in the world, much less the region. but i have voiced concerns as recently as last week at a breakfast with the u.s.-turkey society that i and continue to be worried about the jailing of journalists. turkey now has more journalists in prison than any country in the world, i believe. i have been worried about intimidation of opposition parties. i have been worried about consolidation of power in the hands of the prime minister, a man who i respect and admire a great deal, but i also worry

about authoritarian tendencies in turkey that transcend islamic or any religious reasons. that is a matter of great concern. we should continue to embrace those. it is something not appropriate for a functioning democracy. >> thank you, sir. i'm from sweden. i the question -- i have a question. what you think about how some of the bull died while peace keepers were there -- while peacekeepers were there? >> i think was a horrible event

-- i think it was a horrible event. thousands of people, young and old, were taken out and ethnically cleansed. if there is any news out of something like that, it did galvanize the world into taking action to stop further acts of atrocity from taking place. i think america and our allies should be very proud that we stopped that kind of butchery and ethnic cleansing that was going on in that country. i think it is one of the prouder moments of our ability to work together with like-minded democracy is who respect human rights. >> is the arab league -- what is going on with them? could they be more helpful? what about saudi arabia? >> i have heard reports,

published reports, the saudis are assisting in some ways. the arab league is obviously under the influence of hezbollah. who else -- there are three countries in the arab league to have veto power that makes it much more difficult than it did for concerted action in libya. i know there are members of the arab league who are much more actively involved, but whether the arab league itself, because of veto for a few countries -- i am trying to remember a couple of those. it may be very difficult to get a solid position out of the arab league, as opposed to the situation as it prevailed in libya. as you know, probably the most unpopular person in the arab league at that time was mr. khadafy, since he tried to kill

a few of the leaders of those countries. i guess i have to stop there. we have a distinguished panel of leaders here. i would like to say, particularly, there are a lot of young people in this audience. you come from all over the world, and you are here, i think, to learn and to listen. i hope you will go back and realize that we live, still, in a very dangerous world, one that is fraught with challenges. it is the next generation of leaders throughout the world that can change from a bleak picture, in some cases, to one that is much more optimistic. i believe that you -- your involvement in a cause greater than your own self-interest is the future of this country and the world.

i believe that, when i am associated with people, i am much more optimistic. thank you. [applause] >> the center has raised a great number of issues, and i am thrilled we have a distinguished panel to discuss these issues. we also have, in the audience, members of every major faction of the syrian opposition. i want to extend a welcome to them. sitting next to me on my right is the leading serious human- rights and croats-democracy advocate and author. he is a fellow and a member of the serial working group at the foundation for defense of democracy is. pretty much the most important working group that there is discussing a syrian issues outside the government at this

time. i came to know him in his past role as founder and director of a foundation that in less local activists and citizen journalists to report on social political issues in syria and elsewhere. sitting next to him is brian fishman, who i am thrilled to welcome back to the american enterprise institute. he is a counter-terrorism research fellow at the new america foundation. it is safe to say that his work, especially with the harmony document, has become a must-read for anybody who looks at radicalism within the middle east and the arab world, be it on iraq or syria. i'm thrilled that he has come here today to help share some of his insights. next to him is my old friend david schenker, a former colleague of mine from my days in the pentagon.

he is the author and -- the author of the program on arab politics at the washington institute for near east policy. he recently served in the office of the secretary defense as the pentagon's top aide on arab countries. he is also the author of several fantastic books related to arab countries. last but not least, we have another author, lee smith, the senior editor at "the weekly standard" and a fellow at the author -- center for the defense of democracy is. he is the author of a book published by doubleday in the year 2010. without further ado, since we have so much to discuss, i would like to turn the floor over. >> thank you very much. thank you for that introduction and for inviting me to this event, which comes at a crucial time for syria.

of ben sun the ground continue to accelerate. -- the events on the ground continue to accelerate. the remarks of senator mccain was spot on. he really highlighted a plan of action that we in the syrian operation -- opposition can easily endorse. it corresponds to something we have been talking about for quite a while now. we hope that this administration will become more proactive about the situation and will move faster than has been over the last few months, because, if the current calculations and the administration -- i am not sure there will be a syria after the election. it pains me to say that, but, if you examine the situation right now on the ground, a situation that is -- seems to be paving the way towards the partitioning of the country.

our plan a is to try to keep control of every part of the country. i sought is trying to crack down as violently as he can all the forces movements and communities from the southern end of syria to the northern and, --end, but he also seems to be preparing for a plan b of a majority enclave in the essential parts of syria. also homs city. the ethnic cleansing campaigns are taking place. it is happening. more than half the population of that city in homs, on a 600,000 people, have been displaced since the beginning of the revolution. series ofng a

shelling of towns. that is driving people to the east. we're seeing campaigns that are meant to ethnically cleanse thewe have seen an especially hot a -- the sunni population. we're seeing an attempt ethnic cleansing that is already geared in the mountains. there are still several more to go. the city population -- sunni population live under virtual siege, surrounded by checkpoints all around the neighborhoods. every night, and we have videos to prove it, there is a terror campaign that takes place, where

pro-assad militias are shooting into the air and tried to terrify the population. it is only a matter of time before there will be an attempt at ethnically cleansing these neighborhoods. we are seeing that being implemented. this is not an imagination. we have the videos, we have the pacts. -- facts. people have gone to these areas and describe what has been taken place in detail. this is not a hypothetical scenario anymore. it is not a hypothetical scenario. it is something that you are seeing being implemented. it seems to be the plan that, if there will be intervention, and a subtle be forced out -- i saw it will be forced back, his fallback is to take control of the east. the problem is, with the control of homs, it is the city to which

all major roads connect from south syria to north syria and northeastern syria. controlling the city is not just a partitioning into one city, but into different areas, a south, in northeast, and in north. if the opposition does not congeal in these areas, we might see each one of these regions in different cantons. we might end up with an allied state supported and protected, and a multiplicity of ethnic cantons developing all over the country. again, this is no longer a hypothetical scenario. this is now being worked on. as a result of the crackdown that i saw the -- al-assad is leading, it is the ability to

perform this. i will not repeat the plan given here by senator mccain, but this is why it is important for it to be implemented now instead of waiting and waiting. it has never -- time has never been on our side in this revolution. back in may, and june, and july, when we were beginning to see how violent of a course assad was willing to take, when that city was taken by force, the international community had a time to say will not allow that and issue a strong warning to assad that intervention will be on the table. instead, there was a lot of different. you heard a lot of statements by

countries, including the head of nato, saying that there would be no intervention. that gave him the go-ahead to continue to pursue that policy. now we do not have the luxury of continuing to wait without thinking about the ramifications. the country is being partitioned. waiting will allow for the partitioning to actually take effect. there will be repercussions felt in lebanon, iran, jordan, and perhaps even in israel. the stability of the region is at stake. the actors are waiting and perhaps they will be beginning to infiltrate the company -- country. the time to act is now. mccaul on this administration is that, while i understand all about the calculations of elections and so on, there is a larger calculation at stake,

geopolitical interests of some many countries, and a humanitarian issue. we cannot wait any more. the time is that -- the time to act is now. with this, i include -- conclude. >> i want to thank everyone for having me here. i will talk a little that about the increase -- what we see here that seem to indicate a larger jihadi presence. i will be a little bit of a discordant voice. i am not nearly as optimistic about the prospects for military action to produce the outcomes we would like to see in syria. i think that jihadi elements are likely to benefit from the situation. there'll be a very unproductive effect across the region. i think that there is a role for more active american presence skeptical,i'm

frankly, that military action can produce the action we would like to see. good intentions do not make good policy. bottom line. one thing that interests me about the common -- a debate about syria is that -- the historical analogies we used to understand it. we use this as soon -- human beings. with syria-lebanon, syria- coastal, syria-iraq. how do we understand what our actions will produce in a situation like that? it is no surprise that we all intuitively pick and choose the an argument we would like to make. the big difference with syria from all of these places is that the stakes are much, much higher. they are higher, for all the reasons that senator mccain laid out. the opportunities of a

successful outcome are much higher, and the negative repercussions of a bad outcome are much higher. so the purposes and the goals he would like to achieve our run them. we can iran, we can hezbollah, limit the murder of civilians -- weaken iran, we can has the law, then it the murder of civilians. our goal is to limit president assad, create safe zones, and increase military support rebels. one of the issues i want to point out is that i think there is a very, very important risk of mission creep here with the creation of six sons. i do not think that treating a state sen is an option -- safe zone is an option, frankly. it would be difficult to do that over the long run. that cannot limit the murder of civilians. it will produce a backlash by

the enemy. the enemy will perceive that as an effort to overthrow the regime and, at that point, perhaps options would come on the table we do not want to think about. attacks against western troops in the region. hezbollah attacks -- last time we intervened in this part of the world, a lot of marines died. those things are real cost -- 's -- possibility. there are, -- there are real negative repercussions for all this. there are some costs. the benefits are known, but the cost of the situation -- there's a growing jihadi group in syria. the most recently announced group is releasing information via typical propaganda outlets.

it is not a strong group, a group that can compete with the major opposition groups. tiaoi -- jihadi organizations in most places are not viable competitors for political power. they tend to shoot themselves in the foot. it will not take over syria under any circumstances. what they'll do is make things a lot worse. they make the assad regime and his supporters a lot more entrenched. it makes it much more difficult to get to that point that senator mccain pointed to, where you might have been negotiated solution. if you can create more of a military balance, the assad regime and his supporters would be willing to cut a deal. the g hot lists out there do not want to throw -- the g. todd --

jihadist went to overthrow the government because they believe they are apostates and fundamentally deserve death. as brave as the vast majority of the syrian opposition is, i am unconvinced, from historical precedent, that they'll be able to control a small jihadi group in that environment. it will make the situation worse, make negotiations difficult. we have to recognize that. the situation in syria with jihadi was worse than with libya. the libyan situation was blown out for -- proportioned. it was not a major jihadi element in libya. the problem in syria is that the a side --assad regime had tolerated jihadi elements. but, there is a reality on the

ground, i think, where the key hud -- the jihadi threat is greater. the proximity to iraq, where there is still a active al qaeda element that is still capable. a couple of questions. what comes next? the goals and purposes of military intervention are clear. when we want to achieve is clear. the issue is whether or not these mechanisms will get us where we want to go. i am skeptical that they are. what comes after? i think jihadi groups can organize and syria. i am not convinced that there will be a cohesive government structure afterwards. i would like to hear more about that, but what we will see is that you have a lot of countries in the region. right now, they all agree that

assad should go. i do not think they all agree what should come after. after he falls, do they all agree on what will happen, or will they approach their -- support their own policies? i think that is more likely. what will happen with syrian chemical and biological weapons? will assad use them? if he falls, do the matriculate to al qaeda? how do we control the things? we cannot pursue a direct policy of getting rid of assad unless we have good answers. there are folks who are worried about the impact on the united nations and multilateral -- that is not my concern. my concern, what are the unintended consequences of these actions, and do the undermined u.s. national security and regional security? i worry very much about the

saudis in particular. some of the rhetoric seems to indicate that they are tolerating some of the traveling jihadi types who might go to syria. the folks who want to fight assad, five years ago these are people going to anwar to blow themselves up. a very similar dynamic. we have to be very careful, i think, with our allies in the region, that we do not open the door to that scenario. there is an argument to be made there that we should engage more actively as part of a a pro quo, that they would crack down and limit those groups, but we need to keep our eyes open to that possibility. ultimately, i am very bearish on syria. i do not see a lot of good outcomes here with or without military action. i think is a very ugly and dangerous situation.

our efforts as the international community need to be focused on limiting human suffering as much as possible, but also limiting the spread of conflict to a iraq, to lebanon, and, more broadly. that is where we need to put our interest and our efforts. i think you very much. >> michael, thanks for hosting this important panel at this important time. senator mccain is great. i have nothing else to say. i can stop right there. it is hard to believe that we are approaching the one-year anniversary, august 18, of when president obama called for the syrian president to step down. nearly a year has passed. it has been about five months since the ill-advised kofi anon plan, which rolled back the teeth of the arab league plan.

this was a mistake. particularly because the plan did not even call for assad to leave, which the president had done. when kofi and on was interviewed about that shortly after introducing it, about whether he was committed to departure, he said that this is up to the syrian people to decide. as if the syrian people ever have a say about their own future. it was never going to happen. the assad regime would not allow journalists, was not going to allow these protests. it would mean the end of the regime, a period. the regime what is paid in its own demise. -- would not participate in its own demise. now this comes after the russians have vetoed the u.n. security council resolution. this heralded the start of massacres. there have been massacres opera,

but this is one mr. to pick up. -- all throughout, but this is when it started to pick up. we still do not have a plan b perio. back in february, after the mass killings started, this administration leaked that it was planning a plan b period unterberg 28, 22 of, -- 2012, cnn got a suit -- scoop from an official that said the pentagon had drawn up detailed plans for military action against the regime. or have they? i considered -- a remarkable statement, he should look for it. the remarkable june 7 statement from martin dempsey. general dempsey was asked to " give us some idea about if

military operations to be required to stop the killing of civilians and syria." general dempsey answers, i cannot do that. i cannot do that, because i have to know what the outcome is. tell me what the outcome is and i can build to a plan to achieve that outcome. he says, tommy the u.n. regime put -- change in iran. -- tell me that you want regime change in iran. tommy that following the regime change in syria, -- tell me that following the regime change you want me to restore order, and i know that looks like. anything vis-a-vis syria would be hypothetical in the extreme, and i cannot go to plan unless i understand the outcome. but didn't president obama said, on august 18, the that assad had to go? this is two weeks ago. he is saying he cannot plan because he does not know or understand the outcome. it is remarkable.

it seems that general dempsey is lacking guidance regarding the and a state of water want to reach an -- the end state of what we want in syria. the fact that it took more than a year -- we still do not have more this guidance -- this guidance, this is indicative. time matters. you heard it from senator mccain. the longer the fight continues, the more bad trends are going to emerge. you have radicalization, the islamic nation of the revolt -- islamization of the revolt. there's a trend in what is going on on the ground. al qaeda fighters entering syrian territory is not a surprise. this is home base, in a way, for many of these jihadists.

they would come back to syria after killing americans and iraq. we know this. this is home. they are familiar with this. been heavyategy has on using the al qaeda scare tactic. the longer this goes on, the higher chance it has of getting and -- becoming a reality, and the higher chance of the movement becoming islamic. that is the problem. unlike the national syrian council, which i think is a basket case, the free syrian council -- free syrian army is becoming better. operations are becoming more effective. they have 300 separate identified counties on the ground. there is no more shortages of ammunition. they're killing at -- assad

forces. in the future, they will control territory. already, the regime cannot control territory. they'll take -- territory and go -- called it. while this is a positive development, it will also leave and governments that al qaeda likes. as a result, some of these chemical weapons, some of the 40 or so wmd sites in syria that contain weapons, they may go. is a large, nasty program. they also have production facilities. the third trend that we are seeing -- this is ethnic cleansing. there are two reasons why the assad region is doing this -- regime is doing this. they do have a plan b period

that is to create their own land. they're creating -- clearing out areas to make sure that there are no hostels in the area. the second reason they are doing that is that massacres on the scale they are doing hasten civil war. they want civil war. if it is an insurgency, we can decide and get involved. it is a civil war, we do not want any of that. that is domestic -- we can get killed. the first in the comes to mind is lebanon in the 1980's. so civil war for them is a good thing. it keeps us away. it is a good thing for them, the lack of urgency on outside to end -- our side to end the slaughter. what do we do in the future about this? senator mccain has it right. we should give more assistance to the free syrian army,

including tactical guidance. this means boots on the ground. not boots on the ground of syria, but boots on the ground of turkey. i am talking about special forces, one colonel, a handful of majors. the work on a command and control. they go in and organize, help increase their army, decrease the number of atrocities they are perpetrating, and make sure we do not have what looks like libya in the end, with hundreds of militias not beholden to a government refusing to disarm, and the government having to bribe them to provide security. we do not want that. that is one. we should be building, as the senator said, a coalition of the women. -- coalition of the women. which plan operations -- coalition of the willing.

russia, iran, and venezuela are acting without u.s. consent. they are not seeking our consent, sending weapons to kill syrian people. we do not have to seek their consent to of the syrian people defend themselves. we cannot let our iran policy be held hostage -- assyria policy be held hostage by iran. we can do both. i will conclude in a second. we should also stop restrain turkey. according to one fellow who is a great colleague and friend, secretary of state clinton met with the turkish foreign minister. he put forward a set of measures, including creating a set of -- a buffer zone and equipping the free syrian army. he told -- she said it no less

than three times that we are not there. we are restraining the turks from doing something that is beneficial. ankara wants political cover. when turkey -- normally, turkey is not soft. the act in their national interest as they see fit. but i think we have to help the turks to be the best turks they can be here. go create a buffer zone. we should not be constraining them. if the turks are genuinely interested in a leading role, we are certainly not doing it. but we should not be stopping them from doing it. a buffer zone, it would be a water -- a watershed for syrian opposition. it would create mass defections. we should be recognizing the syrian government, like libya.

that is, not only booting out syrian diplomats, but turning over the embassy to the syrian opposition. there is now talking to them anymore unless they want to talk about going to venezuela, pteron, or moscow. i think they are beyond the pale. we should act like other nations like libya. thank you. >> thanks, david. it is a pleasure to be up here with you. thank you very much. it was a huge stir all to be here with senator -- huge thrill to be here with senator mccain and delivering the keynote. i work at "the weekly standard." i have been writing polemical articles attacking the administration over its syria policy, among other things, but especially on syria. i figured i would try to be less polemical and try to open things up for speculation, ask some

general questions. the particular place i want to focus on is one senator mccain was talking about -- why the assad is important strategically. we keep saying in this administration that iran is central, a central regional issue. other people say it as well, including domestic adversaries of the administration. but what i -- the questions i want to ask, the things i want to look around or to try to explore very briefly and quickly -- if that is really the case, if people regard iran as a central issue, or if whether we confuse syria policy, that maybe iran is not as important as many of us have been sent. let me start with one comment,

quickly, about an important issue brian raised when he was talking about concern about al qaeda and other jihadis. the big concern right now is not local islamists, just regular sunnis. what is an happening the last year, the campaigns of ethnic cleansing that we have spoken quite clearly about -- this is a big deal. we saw what happened in houla, where the majority of the victims came from one family. is that right? they came from one sunni family. what we have seen happen over the course of the last year is that, i'm the the impression that the civil war has been going on much longer than one year.

it basically started when they came to power in 1966. for better or worse, syria has lots of sectarian issues. let's be frank about it. i believe the civil war has been going on for a long time. we see different episodes of the fighting. we side at 1980, we saw in the 1960's, we have seen a lot of fighting. over the last year we have seen an especially hot episode of this fighting going on. to me, that is the issue. it is a sectarian war. it is ugly now, and it will get much uglier. i raise that because one interesting thing we have seen happen is that a lot of times the ideas -- the ideas of the regular sunnis, who lived in syria regardless of their religious belief -- this has been the lighted frequently with al qaeda. that has been going on for quite

a while. no doubt, as david was talking about, al qaeda and the suny fighters have been there for a while. this is primarily the fault of the regime that cultivated and nurtured these relationships. it is hardly surprising now these guys should still be around. one thing that i wanted to speculate about is, do we know who is controlling these groups right now? we did not know for the last decade, when there were going into iraq. i happen to believe that most of these guys to describe themselves as sunni groups are really fighters, but whether or not they are operating according to their own plans, that is an entirely different question. how much control does the regime have or the last 10 years? how much regina control does damascus have over these noun? that may be something we can talk about later. i think we do not know that. that is what i would put forth.

let me come back to you very quickly now. why, in the framework of iran, why does the administration still say that it does not know if there are recipients of weapons on the ground in syria? one of the concerns is that we have seen the nc quite -- say quite clearly it would wind up in the hands of al qaeda. that is the last thing we want. partly for political reasons, but there are also real military reasons as well. we do not want these weapons floating around like a lot of weapons that went into real libya -- into libya are floating around. that is not something people what happened. -- one happening. i want to warn people about the allusion been made between al qaeda and the sunnis. why can not the administration make this distinction? this is a reflection of the

intelligence community, that it's still, after one year, has no idea who the good guys are and the bad guys are in syria? they probably have something of an idea now. the most important thing now is that the administration has made a decision and said, the president has made it a preference of his policy to identify the good guys in syria -- who are we going to back and who are we going to arm? i submit that the intelligence community would come up with a good idea of who we should be backing and armin. the fact that we are not harming the tebow suggests -- -- arming these people does not suggest that we cannot tell the difference, but that we do not want to. i would say, what does this mean about our iran policy? if you have the general saying that the fall of this regime represent the greatest setback for iran in the last 25 years --

i happen to believe that is accurate. senator mccain articulate the same. he also put a fine a point on it, describing hezbollah. syria represents its supply line. has the law has an awful lot of arms right now. even if it were to topple today, they probably have enough missiles and rockets for more than one round with israel. they have a lot of weapons. nonetheless, for has a lot to lose its strategic -- for hezbollah to reduce its ally would recognize -- represent a huge setback, and iran recognizes this. that is a reason why we should lend some credence to reports that there are both rigc fighters and has bullfighters in syria to keep the regime afloat. -- hezbollah fighters in syria

to keep the regime afloat. if there are foreign fighters in syria, what is the military position look like? let me go through this quickly. if we believe that the iranian threat is that significant, why don't we look for an opportunity to take them on whenever possible, especially, as everybody is saying, david said we need boots on the ground in turkey but not syria. nobody is calling for american troops in syria right now. the idea is back in a proxy force in syria. -- backing a proxy force in syria. the administration has clearly said we are not moving toward a policy of containment and deterrence. what we believe is preventing the iranians from getting a nuclear weapons program. in either case, what that means

is not just a credible threat of force, but the actual use of force, as happened during the cold war and proxy forces. i am not sure why we are reluctant to back the free syrian army. one possibility is that we do not think -- we think syria is a distraction. we think iran is much more important. this may be a reason why russia -- why we have given russia a leading role. we expect the russians to deliver the iranians of the next few days to begin with, then over the next of this -- rest of this negotiation process. the other possibility, and i'll close with this, is that we do not think the iranian nuclear program -- i think it is, i have not heard the argument made, but i can see how it would be made

-- the iranian nuclear program is not that big of an issue. the israelis have a problem with it, let the israelis deal with it. but our issue, our issue is not what the american interest is -- is the american interest, not protecting israel. the persian gulf is an american lake. this is our interest. it is now have a by sunni powers, so the idea that we keep eliding sunnis and al qaeda says something about our policy and how we perceive the program generally. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. what i would like to do is immediately move on to q&a. a couple months before we do. when you are handed the microphone, please state your name and affiliation. i believe in what we call

jeopardy rules. if you have a statement to make, phrase it in the form of a question. for those who might be tempted to ask more questions, ask as many questions as you want, they will only answer the first question so we get as much back and forth as possible and get as many people as possible asking questions. >> thank you for the great empirical statement. i'm a teacher. allowed to go back to senator mccain for a second. i was struck by his call to action, which seemed to hinge on a decision -- we hold these truths to be self evident that all men are created equal. he seems to be at the heart of the american exceptional is an argument. i want to ask the entire panel -- this argument, the idea that one nation is pitched to universal right for, and therefore national sovereignty

dissolves in the face of this. you have a nation of exceptional as and based on universal ideals. the supply for all sovereignty, just speaking. >> -- these apply for all sovereignty, generally speaking. >> who would be -- like to take that? >> let me rephrase it, if i may. you are saying, because the united states has an exceptional last few of itself, that means that it perceives itself as able to trample the sovereignty of other nations? is that what you mean? [inaudible] >> let me phrase it this way. if the panelists could rephrase

-- address the idea of sovereignty with universalism and idealism call some -- also the issue of multilateralism. >> i do not see it in terms of a violation of syrian sovereignty and universal values. the way i phrased it, my argument is in terms of u.s. interests, and especially regarding iran and the iranian nuclear program. that's how i see a. >> he had it right. he identified the intersection of american values and national interest. we cannot fix everything everywhere, but this is a clear case where it meet both criteria. [no audio] >> about the strategic utility of actions and expected outcomes of these actions, not our motivations for taking them. again, i worry, in this case,

that actions are not necessarily going to advance or cause the way we would like into. that is where my note of caution would come in. >> other questions? i would like to start in the back and work our way forward, some people who have not had the opportunity before can ask questions. >> thank you. i'm from the center for global development. my colleagues have been working on a new idea, a new tool -- a diplomatic tool for addressing these situations. it is called pre-emptive contract sanctions. the basic idea is you declare that, as of a particular date, the assad regime would be declared illegitimate. this can be done multilaterally, with other governments, and would be more effective that

way. this could have a direct impact on companies in russia and china doing business with the regime by tightening the squeeze on them and making it known that their contract might not be enforceable if the successor government chooses to repudiate them. it would protect the successor government from being saddled with illegitimate debt from the regime. i think this is a diplomatic tool that could be considered. we discussed maybe not having any more diplomatic tools, so i wonder if your thoughts on this, the diplomatic tools, and other ways we can address the russian issue diplomatically. >> it was a question about diplomacy before directed towards senator mccain. i think his skepticism was called for. if you look at what the regime is doing -- i wrote a book about the use of force and coercion, that is how middle eastern politics works. we're talking about this in terms of ethnic cleansing. i and we're past the point of

diplomacy. . maybe i am misunderstanding, but i do not see how that will happen. >> the syrian national council said it will not honor any contract with russia. weapons are being sold from russia to the regime to kill them. that is not stopping russia from sending more weapons. >> i think these things are worth trying. i do not think they are necessarily independent of military action. i think you can do all of those things simultaneously, if we felt like it. i think it is interesting, not directly related, when you look at some of the jihadi discourse about syria, it is interesting to note that russia and china have become the big bugaboos, the way the united states was a

singular way in the past. china is increasingly seen as a major problem by jihadi organizations. they import just as much oil as we do now. that does not mean that they will change their focus, but i do think that you see the popular resentment towards russia and china reflected across the arab world, because of the report for the assad regime. this is sharpened in some of those really ugly jihadi movements. it is interesting that those two countries backing the syrian regime will face the consequences from these ugly non-state actors. >> i will use the moderator's prerogative and jumping on this question. military academies speak the dime paragigm, that every

strategy should have diplomatic, incurred -- informational, military, an economic component. as the conflicts drive on, there are eventually, various companies, be it in france, russia, china perhaps, decided they were going to break international isolation by trying to win contracts up to and including the last days of saddam hussein. i do think that sanctions can provide some positive pressure. at the same time, if it is not adopted by the syrian national council but is also adopted by declaration in london and in washington as a policy of the

british government and the american government it can perhaps have some weight to in courts and discussions as various governments and companies try to pick up the pieces should the assad regime fall >> look, i think these kinds of movement are important. i wish they had been undertaken

months ago. right now, it is okay. let's have them, but not as a substitute for intervention. i also want to abuse my prerogative as a palace. the response -- as a panelist. the response on read -- john j. autism -- jihadists, is not that i'm agreeing with you or that i think this is not a complex situation. we should consider intervention more strongly, because reality is that without the possibility of influence on the ground for intervention, you have given jihadists more leeway on the ground that you should. with that said, jihadist are not independent actors, especially in the middle east and in syria. one of the sponsors of the jihadist movement -- and you have seen this in lebanon. they have been up until recently very much infill trading -- infiltrating the movement like marionettes to do their building -- their bidding.

i doubt very much thatjihadists are actually a creation of assad. but why they have created them -- up until a few days ago, there was an interview with a jihadist that was imprisoned. and before he carried out a suicide attack. what was the target? was it a particular neighborhood? it was not. was a church? it was not. and was a mosque at the center of the protest movement in the neighborhood. this was one of the thorny places. the mosque was at the center of the assad regime. but people would go there and hold daily and weekly protests, and it challenges the -- a challenge in the uprising.

these are very strange jihadists, really. they go out and kill the people they are supposed to be supporting. the idea at is to create problems for the protests community and for the protest leaders and those in their own community. they are not only interested in creating their own areas, but also in making sure the other areas are destabilized. they are not congealing into one government. they have a series of challenges that they have to surmount. on the other hand, they are giving the jihadist program -- problems as well. they were encouraging them, using them, and if they lost control at some point, who cares?

it will be trouble for the government that will emerge in the rest of ziarat -- and the rest of syria. this is why they were trying to get booed on the ground and to train the fsa and to how the fsa. -- help the fsa. they need to train security forces and police forces to make sure that they address these kinds of challenges, because they have been trained to do so more effectively than the local fighters. they need to make sure these kinds of challenges are under control from the beginning. >> i agree, if we were going to train folks -- i think the description of how to do it that david gave it makes a lot of sense. in my mind, a stronger argument for that cars -- that course of action exist then for using international air power.

to because i do not think that mission can be sustained. it will become a mission to remove the assad regime. if that is what we want to do, then we should get on with it. i'm skeptical it will work. but clarity about goals is very important. i agree with you that i think the presence of jihadist groups in syria benefits the assad regime. but i do not think that necessarily means that those groups are a product of the assad regime or working for the regime. i think at times, the assad regime will manipulate those elements to try to create problems for the opposition. and i think it is clear that the assad regime is using

propaganda of those small groups to try to discredit the opposition. that is something we all need to push back against because it is simply not true. we should also not overstate the connection between the assad regime and the jihadists. the regime enables jihadist groups on their way to iraq, and we have documents of that. very clear documentary evidence of that. i would argue as much as there are jihadists and traveling through syria into iraq, and we have record of it, we also have very good testimony of captured shiites that iraqi shiite fighters were being flown to damascus for training by hezbollah. the assad regime was playing both sides during the war. that is what regime is due. they look out for number one.

this is not a regime that is in bed with the jihadist by any means. they will try to create trouble for their opposition. at the end of the day, in my judgment, there is an independent jihadist movement, certainly the divide your jihadist community believes in and is supporting that group. they feel is one of their own. i am not in a great position to make that decision independently. but the regional work of the jihadists is in a better position and they have made that judgment. though the existence of that growth helps assad politically and operationally, i think what it does is help him keep control of the dominant military because it scares those folks. it does not have to be a dominant group. it can be a small group. but it sres those folks. it allows assad to say, if you'd effect on me, those are

the people you have to deal with. -- if you defect on me, those are the people you have to deal with. >> if you like to ask questions, make yourself known where you are sitting. are there questions toward the back? yes, sir, with the glasses. and second to that, john ahman right in front of him. -- the gentleman right in front of him. >> i think most of the speakers are very much in favor of what senator mccain said today, with the exception of mr. fishman. if you could give your plan of what you would like to see happen in syria and how that separates you from everyone else.

thanks. >> well, you got me. to shape. -- touche. i think there is a program, as some have indicated, of stepped-up sanctions. i think we need to reach out to as many factions as possible in iran and iraq to stop the spread of what is happening there. i think we need to establish programs to stop the spread of nauert and to plan our to try to stop the spread of dangerous weapons from syria as possible. none of those are perfect answers. i think we should explore a dedicated program to try to understand the syrian opposition such that we can make good decisions if we want to support someone like that in a program, as david was talking about. i think we have developed the kind of knowledge -- that kind of knowledge. and i do not want to make the argument that there is not a

place we want to do that. but what i am very wary have is this notion of safe zones and trying to carve out direct action against the syrian regime. and i think the regime is acting from a position of fear internationally, and from a position of fear where they could lash out in really unpredictable ways. we need to consider the interest in iran. if we can pull this off, it is the biggest blow against them in 25 years.

but they will push back in iraq in a big way and in afghanistan a big way. if anything, the loss of syria will retrench the running regime's desire for a nuclear weapon. some would argue that they could not desired more. it that as possible. but i think all of that is a repercussion here that we should consider. >> i will just repeat the question so the microphones will pick it up. the question is, what about the slaughter? how does one deal with the responsibility to protect and the humanitarian crisis -- crisis? that is directed to the whole panel. >> i will speak just briefly because i have been talking a lot. we have an obvious

responsibility to do what we can to stop the slaughter, not just in syria, but in other places. we t